The present medical diagnosis of brain death requires the presence of coma and the absence of some brainstem reflexes. The brainstem reflexes involved are not, in themselves, indications of death: a person who is conscious is alive, even if he or she is unable to breathe and has fixed pupils with no corneal reflex, no vestibulo-ocular reflex, no gag or cough reflexes and no response to pain. The fundamental requirement is that there be permanent coma (that is, irreversible loss of consciousness), and the loss of brainstem reflexes is important only because it is a convenient way of demonstrating that the coma is permanent.
In fact, a person is dead when there is irreversible loss of consciousness-without consciousness there can be no personality, and no person 1 • 2 • Death of the cerebral cortex therefore implies death of the person. All other definitions of death are really indirect ways of diagnosing permanent loss of consciousness, and many past definitions (such as cessation of spontaneous respiration or heartbeat) have been abandoned when it was found that they did not guarantee permanent loss of consciousness.
Permanent coma without death of the body
Of course, there may be irreversible loss of consciousness without death of the whole body, as in the permanent vegetative state-the person is dead, but the body is still alive. When the concept of whole brain death (death of the brainstem and cerebral hemispheres) was introduced, it was argued that death of the brains tern inevitably implied the imminent death (within days) of the whole bodyl. We now know that this is not true, because bodies with a dead brain have been kept alive with infusions of low doses of vasopressin and adrenaline for months (and even longer periods are probably possible, though not desirable)4,5. We have therefore already accepted that a person may be dead without death of the whole body necessarily following soon afterwards.
Changing definitions of death
The definitions of death used in the past and in use now are really indirect methods of diagnosing irreversible loss of consciousness. For many centuries, cessation of spontaneous breathing was used to diagnose death, but artificial ventilation clearly invalidates this method-a conscious quadriplegic on a ventilator is not dead. Similarly, short-term lack of heartbeat had to be abandoned with the advent of cardiac massage, and with extracorporeal membrane oxygenation a person can be conscious for weeks with no heartbeat.
When brain death was first introduced as a definition of death, loss of all function of the central nervous system was required·. It soon became apparent that there could be death of the cerebral hemispheres and brainstem with persistent function of the spinal cord, and death of the spinal cord was dropped as a requirement. It is equally apparent that the brainstem, while being a very useful optional extra, is not the seat of personality and is therefore not fundamental to the survival of the person-so brainstem death should not be a requirement for death. If the reticular activating system were preserved, it is theoretically possible for consciousness to be preserved despite the loss of brainstem reflexes, but consciousness cannot be preserved without the cerebral hemispheres.
The present legal definitions of death in Australia are irreversible cessation of the circulation of the blood or irreversible loss of all function of the brain. These definitions are useable because (at present) they both invariably result in irreversible loss of consciousness. However, they are not ideal definitions on theoretical and practical grounds: they are imperfect in theory because they are only indirect methods of diagnosing Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Vo/. 23, No. I, February, 1995 death (irreversible loss of consciousness) and so would be invalidated if, for example, consciousness could be preserved in a person with no circulation, and they are imperfect in practice because they fail to diagnose death in some cases where the person is, in fact, dead (for example anecephaly or permanent vegetative state).
Conflict between legal and medical definitions
A further problem with the legal definition of brain death (irreversible loss of all function of the brain) is its inconsistency with the medical means used to diagnose brain death (coma plus loss of brainstem reflexes). It is quite clear that some endocrine functions of the brain persist in many patients who are brainstem dead, and it is possible that some neurological brain functions may also be presents. Of course, this contradiction is unimportant if permanent loss of consciousness is accepted as the definition of death-nobody satisfying the full brainstem death criteria (properly applied) has ever recovered consciousness.
Problems with irreversible loss of consciousness
There are two major impediments to the use of irreversible loss of consciousness as the definition of death. First, and most important, is that it will be difficult to have this definition accepted by the community. Anencephalic babies and vegetative patients breathe and have spontaneous eye-opening and roving eye movements-although the person is dead, the body is clearly not dead. However, the power of informed discussion should not be underestimated: as long as five years after publication of the Harvard brain death criteria in 1968 6 , 59070 of United States laypeople and 46% of doctors) did not accept that a person was dead if the brain was dead but the heart was beating 7. Yet that situation changed rapidly, and by 1984, 381 of United States health workers favoured a higher brain (permanent loss of consciousness) definition of deathS. It is probable that permanent loss of consciousness would be widely accepted as the definition of death if the underlying issues were better understood. Paradoxically, some of the strongest opposition to change, or even discussion of the issues involved, comes from the transplant lobby-who fear that any suggestion of change will be misinterpreted as an attempt by the medical profession to snatch organs, and so undermine public confidence in the present system.
The second but less important problem is to decide how permanent loss of consciousness would be diagnosed. The means of diagnosis would change as technology improved, but would include brainstem death as presently diagnosed, irreversible cessation of circulation of the blood to the cerebral cortex (as Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Vol. 23, No. I, February, 1995 shown, for example, by cerebral angiography), the presence of anencephaly and, perhaps, demonstration that intracranial pressure is equal to mean arterial blood pressure. The present brainstem criteria already require the presence of coma as a prerequisite for the diagnosis of death, so philosophical objections that we can never be sure of another individual's state of consciousness apply to the present criteria as well as to a permanent loss of consciousness definition.
Why change present practice?
Providing the present criteria are accurately applied, all patients diagnosed as dead will have permanent loss of consciousness (specificity is 100%). However, the present criteria fail to diagnose death on some occasions when the person is, in fact, dead (sensitivity is less than 100%). This has highly undesirable consequences when families or the courts force treatment to be continued when, for example, there is anencephaly or a permanent vegetative state 9 • Even when treatment is stopped, and these patients die, the organs cannot be used for transplantation-this is an important consideration in paediatric practice, where these conditions account for a higher proportion of potential organ donors.
Another reason that change is desirable is the inconsistency between the law (which requires loss of all function of the brain) and medical practice (which uses criteria that permit endocrine, and perhaps some neurological, functions of the brain to be present in many patients diagnosed as brain dead).
